Cybereagles

Analysis: Argentina 2–4 Nigeria
https://medium.com/solace-on/analysis-a ... 17cf38095a

It was something of a game of two halves in Krasnodar, and although the Super Eagles produced a rousing comeback to win 4–2, Argentina posed difficult questions all game.
My initial thoughts on the game are here, but we’ll attempt a more comprehensive overview of how the game played out. The series started last week will continue in the next post.
It was interesting to hear, leading up to the game, that Gernot Rohr would set the team up to play with three centre-backs, in a 3–4–1–2. Even more so that he was doing it with an eye to specifically combating Argentina. Sampaoli, since his arrival, has largely stuck with a 3 at the back system, but never within a two-striker framework. Here, he played the classic Bielsa 3–3–1–3.

Why this is important? The real advantage of having three centre-backs is that, against an opponent that plays with two strikers, it gives you a spare man, both in build-up and in defensive situations. However, Rohr opting for a 3–5–2 meant he had three defenders picking up one striker, creating a deficit elsewhere (in this case, midfield), while on the attacking front, he was playing into Argentina’s hands.
This was apparent from the start, as Nigeria started the game by trying to pressure from high up. However, neither of the front three seemed sure of their roles; already, they were at a numerical disadvantage, which is the opposite situation for an effective press, but then the lack of coordination in their movements made things worse. Ever Banega positioned himself intelligently, and constantly received the ball with time to turn.

It should be noted, as a caveat, that this was the first time there had been a deviation from 4–2–3–1 under Rohr, and the team had only had one training session. That in itself made the sudden decision to press high impossible to understand — as we have established, this is a team that almost always prefers to sit deeper in a compact shape.

The team also had a problem in midfield with the positioning of Lo Celso and Perez. Playing in a sort of “false full-back” role, they had no direct opponent, and neither Shehu nor Aina could advance to shut them down. Doing that would have left a dangerous 3 on 3 at the back.

Since Ndidi naturally closes down higher up, the team’s solution was to have him shift forward and try to shut down Lo Celso, while Iwobi dropped back slightly to gain access to Perez. This would leave Ogu to deal with Dybala between the lines.

However, this created two big problems problems: (i) with Lo Celso drifting wide and Ndidi tracking, the half-space often opened up for direct runs forward from Otamendi, one of which led to a Perez shot which Akpeyi saved; (ii) Iwobi dropping onto Perez left Mascherano free, and he threaded balls into the feet of Aguero dropping off.

Ndidi and Ogu both push up, and a straight ball from Banega to Dybala takes them out.
Critically though, the team was still trying to press high on goal kicks. This led to the second goal, as Perez and Lo Celso moved into wing-back positions, and Aina felt compelled to step up and maintain access to the former. Both Ndidi and Ogu pushed up at the same time (to keep the team compact) and got taken out by one pass down the middle, from Banega to Dybala. Suddenly, the 3v3 at the back was happening, and the Juventus man slid through to Pavon, who squared for Aguero to finish.

THE COMEBACK
It was important that Iheanacho’s free kick halved the deficit before the break; a set-piece was probably the only way Nigeria could have gotten on the scoresheet. What followed was a storming response in the second half, and it entirely hinged upon returning to the counterattacking approach that has served them so well.

Well, that and the introductions of Bryan Idowu and Tyronne Ebuehi. Both seemed to understand the wing-back roles better: the latter showed greater confidence going forward than Shehu had, and was more dynamic.

Idowu for his part put the Super Eagles in the lead for the first time in the match, but he had also been present in the box when Iwobi swept home the equalizer. This showed how brave he was during attacking transitions, and coming from deeper, he had crucial yards of acceleration to get beyond Enzo Perez.

Beyond all tactical considerations, the entire team just raised their level. Ndidi in particular deserves special praise: the clamor for him to show more facets to his game has been strong from yours truly, and he used his remarkable stamina to get forward, playing at times like a box-to-box dynamo, proactive rather than simply reactive, raising questions rather than seeking to provide punctuation.

There is a mental aspect to this, I feel. Iheanacho and Iwobi rattled Otamendi and Mascherano early on with physicality(!), the former in particular causing his former teammate to lash out, and as the game progressed, both began to gain the upper hand over their opposite number. Iheanacho increasingly dominated Otamendi in 50–50s, and Iwobi’s nutmeg on Mascherano was the final chipping away of the Barcelona man’s confidence.

CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the team triumphed by returning to the approach it knows best, but aside the euphoria, the major tactical experiment was less than successful. As far as Rohr’s in-game decision-making goes, the jury is still out.

Here’s what Leon Balogun told ACLSports after the game regarding the second half comeback.
2–1 was crucial because we went into the locker room, we had some discussions, we had some disagreements about how to defend and how to press them and I think that’s part of football and part of a great team.

We decided not to press them so high anymore with Iwobi and Iheanacho so we can let them come a little bit and stay more compact so the gap between the different lines will not be big anymore.
I might be reading too much into this, but there seems to be a fair degree of brainstorming with regard to how this team sets up tactically, and the decision to revert to what they knew best seems to have come from the players, not the manager. Like I said, maybe just me.

ogasir wrote:How can Rohr's decision making be in doubt when he literally made changes that overturned a 2 goal deficit? Solace na correct ITK and i find a lot of his so called analysis to be BS.

Cellular wrote:Loved the piece.

Tobi17 wrote:EII, so if Rohr introduced Idowu and Ebuehi (two players that pretty much have brought the much needed balance we were lacking in the first half), isn't that a touch of tactical astuteness/flexibility on the part of Rohr?

danfo driver wrote:WHy do people post articles from this charlatan???? I dont go to his twitter, yet, I can not get peace here, in my own home???

Damunk wrote:

danfo driver wrote:WHy do people post articles from this charlatan???? I dont go to his twitter, yet, I can not get peace here, in my own home???

You this guy, you wan kill person....

waka-man wrote:It’s a good piece.
As to whether it was Rohr’s call or a team decision, to be fair he accepts he’s just reading between the lines. Similarly whether idowu and Ebuehi’s superior performance was due to ability or tactical adjustments is tough to tell. Idowu certainly attacked more in the first 10 mins of the 2nd half than Aina did in the whole of the first. That could simply have been instructions (and with the middle more compact, the full backs naturally had more license).
What is clear though is that the second half decision to be compact could only have come from the coach. The swap to the counter attack was more responsible than anything else for the remarkable turn around.

Cellular wrote:Loved the piece.

kzz5joa wrote:

waka-man wrote:It’s a good piece.
As to whether it was Rohr’s call or a team decision, to be fair he accepts he’s just reading between the lines. Similarly whether idowu and Ebuehi’s superior performance was due to ability or tactical adjustments is tough to tell. Idowu certainly attacked more in the first 10 mins of the 2nd half than Aina did in the whole of the first. That could simply have been instructions (and with the middle more compact, the full backs naturally had more license).
What is clear though is that the second half decision to be compact could only have come from the coach. The swap to the counter attack was more responsible than anything else for the remarkable turn around.

He's doing more than reading between the lines. Balogun specifically states that it was a locker room conversation. Solace simply jumped to the conclusion that the coaching crew were either not in the locker room or they just sat idly and watched as the players discussed tactics. The conclusion does a great disservice to the rest of the article.

Schillachi wrote:All me I know sha is that I was not impressed with our performance. Seems we mainly benefited from Iwobi's individual brilliance..

Cellular wrote:

kzz5joa wrote:

waka-man wrote:It’s a good piece.
As to whether it was Rohr’s call or a team decision, to be fair he accepts he’s just reading between the lines. Similarly whether idowu and Ebuehi’s superior performance was due to ability or tactical adjustments is tough to tell. Idowu certainly attacked more in the first 10 mins of the 2nd half than Aina did in the whole of the first. That could simply have been instructions (and with the middle more compact, the full backs naturally had more license).
What is clear though is that the second half decision to be compact could only have come from the coach. The swap to the counter attack was more responsible than anything else for the remarkable turn around.

He's doing more than reading between the lines. Balogun specifically states that it was a locker room conversation. Solace simply jumped to the conclusion that the coaching crew were either not in the locker room or they just sat idly and watched as the players discussed tactics. The conclusion does a great disservice to the rest of the article.

In team sports particularly football, adjustments are made by both the coaching staff and the players. The players can say, that the system is not working or that they need to tweak or adjust it. Swapping of player positions (i.e. switching sides) is typically the coaches call. Getting the spacing right is typically the coaches call as well.

The second half adjustments were both tactical and the belief they could compete against these guys. Once they realized that they can hang with the Argies the game took a different turn. Our goal before the half was huge... our goal tying goal cemented that belief.

And yes, players do talk tactics. Sometimes, players on the own switch tactics... it is typically a joint effort.

What is more comforting for me is the willingness of the coaches to listen to his players and work with what they are good at...

Schillachi wrote:All me I know sha is that I was not impressed with our performance. Seems we mainly benefited from Iwobi's individual brilliance..

Schillachi wrote:All me I know sha is that I was not impressed with our performance. Seems we mainly benefited from Iwobi's individual brilliance..

kzz5joa wrote:

Schillachi wrote:All me I know sha is that I was not impressed with our performance. Seems we mainly benefited from Iwobi's individual brilliance..

But there were other players involved in the transition of the ball from the midfield to Iwobi so his brilliance was a result of the combined team effort. We don't need to dwell on the result of the game, but I was very impressed with the half-time adjustments. Players tried not to dwell too long on the ball (a trait which has been quite bothersome with some of our teams in the past) so they could execute quick counters which resulted in the goals. At a point, it almost seemed that each counter-attack would result in a goal which shows that they recognized and took advantage of Argentina's weaknesses.

Robotnik wrote:Fact:
Rohr messed up when he decided to play 3-5-2 in the first half against the attack minded Argentinians.
The personnel were still trying to understand how to work it when Argentina score 2 goals.
Contrary to popular belief, Nigeria did not play 3-5-2 in the second half.
We played the same formation we have always been playing when in bunker mode, which is 5-3-2.
The difference was that we did not revert to 4-2-3-1 when in possession.
The change in full backs (Idowu and Ebuehi) helped to translate /actualize the formation Rohr intended - 3-5-2
The goal keeper helped restore confidence to the team.

It should be noted, as a caveat, that this was the first time there had been a deviation from 4–2–3–1 under Rohr, and the team had only had one training session. That in itself made the sudden decision to press high impossible to understand — as we have established, this is a team that almost always prefers to sit deeper in a compact shape.